Chemical plant explosion in Shandong province; 5 dead, 19 injured

Via South China Morning Post: 

An explosion at a chemical plant in Shandong province in eastern China on Tuesday has killed five people with a further six still missing, state broadcaster CCTV reported.

The explosion, which occurred at a site owned by Shandong Youdao Chemical in Gaomi city just before noon, also left 19 people injured.

The local emergency management bureau said on-site search and rescue operations and clean-up work had continued into the night.

The cause is yet to be determined.

The accident created a large fireball and sent clouds of smoke hundreds of metres into the air. Residents reported hearing a loud bang and said the blast had shattered the windows of many houses.

My sense is that this is one of the many thousands of smaller-scale (relatively speaking) chemical plants in China. Best wishes to the victims and their families. 

Reuters on the Chinese-Mexican illicit chemical trade

Via Reuters, interesting details on the fentanyl manufacturing supply chain: 

...Javier said the Chinese supplier sends some precursors by air in small packages to Mexico City’s international airport. Many are piperidines, compounds at the core of fentanyl’s structure. A little goes a long way. Javier declined to go into details about where the packages go immediately after clearing customs. He did say they’re often flown out of the capital on small planes to Sinaloa.

Chemicals needed in greater volumes, such as propionyl chloride, often come via cargo ship. Javier said his group moves “tons” of precursors through the Port of Manzanillo each year. In addition, he says his team pays millions of dollars in bribes annually to officials at the port — including to customs agents and, more recently, naval officers — to ensure the goods exit the port smoothly.

“We spring the chemicals out without problems,” Javier said.

Interdiction efforts when significant bribery is in play is probably pretty tough. 

C&EN: "Court overturns conviction of chemist Feng “Franklin” Tao"

In this week's C&EN, this news (article by Leigh Krietsch Boerner): 

The 10th US Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver voted 2–1 on July 11 to throw out the conviction of former University of Kansas (KU) chemist Feng “Franklin” Tao. A jury had found Tao guilty of one count of making false statements to KU, the US National Science Foundation, and the US Department of Energy because he did not disclose connections to Fuzhou University in China.

Judge Nancy Louse Moritz states in the ruling that there was insufficient evidence that Tao’s disclosure statement to KU was relevant to the two government agencies. “We reverse Tao’s conviction and remand for the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal,” she writes.

Tao was tried in March 2022 under the China Initiative, a controversial program that the US Department of Justice created to crack down on economic espionage. The Biden administration ended the program in February 2022 because it was targeting people of Asian descent.

In April 2022, the Kansas City, Kansas, jury found Tao guilty of one count of making false statements and three counts of wire fraud. US District Judge Julie A. Robinson, who oversaw Tao’s trial, acquitted him of the wire fraud counts in September of that year. In January 2023, she sentenced him to time served and supervised release for two years.

I continue to marvel at the lack of results from the China Initiative to actually crack down on Chinese espionage in the United States. 

Chinese food products are transported in fuel tankers?

Via Reuters, this news: 

BEIJING, July 9 (Reuters) - China's food safety commission will investigate the alleged use of fuel tanker trucks to transport cooking oil, state media reported on Tuesday, amid fears of possible food contamination.

Local daily The Beijing News last week reported that state stockpiler Sinograin's fuel tankers were found transporting food products like cooking oil, soybean oil and syrup, without cleaning the tankers in between.

The food safety commission will hold a special meeting with state planning agency the National Development and Reform Commission, the State Administration of Grain and Reserves, and other ministries to discuss and investigate the allegations, state broadcaster CCTV reported.

"Illegal enterprises and relevant responsible persons will be severely punished in accordance with the law and will not be tolerated," CCTV said.

It is really interesting to think about various aspects of Chinese society and see where they are in comparison to the broad sweep of history. While it seems sometimes that Chinese industrial food practices are a lot closer to "The Jungle" than not, I'm sure there are places (electronic cash transfers?) where they seem to be living in the future. 

Decoupling China, going with India?

Via the New York Times: 

Melissa & Doug had a situation. For decades, the American toy brand had leaned heavily on factories in China to make its products — wooden puzzles, stuffed animals, play mats. Suddenly, that course looked risky.

It was February 2021, and the world was besieged by a pandemic. Lockdowns disrupted Chinese factories. Trade hostilities between Washington and Beijing were undermining the benefits of depending on plants in China. President Donald J. Trump had slapped tariffs on a broad variety of Chinese imports, increasing their prices, and President Biden extended that policy.

Melissa & Doug was eager to shift some production to other countries. Which explained the arrival of its chief supply chain officer at a factory in Greater Noida, a fast-growing city about 30 miles southeast of the Indian capital, New Delhi.

The factory was owned by a family business called Sunlord. The Melissa & Doug executive was surprised to see that the plant could make high-quality wooden toys, at prices comparable to those in China. Late last year, Sunlord completed its first batch of products for Melissa & Doug, a modest order of about 10,000 items, and now is cranking out 25,000 per month.

I presuming that consumer firms like Melissa and Doug and WalMart are simply diversifying their supplier base. It will be interesting to see if the Indian and South Korean pharma manufacturing markets grow as the BIOSECURE Act is actually passed (if it indeed is passed.) 

C&EN: "Asymchem to operate former Pfizer plant in Europe"

Via C&EN, this grimly ironic news (article by Aayushi Pratap): 

Making its entry into Europe, the Chinese pharmaceutical services firm Asymchem will take over as the operator of the former Pfizer small-molecule pilot plant in Sandwich, England. The company will also run a part of the development laboratories that will open in June. The site will include facilities for peptides and oligonucleotides and continuous flow and biocatalysis capabilities; it will house about 100 workers, including those previously employed by Pfizer. In 2022, Asymchem’s effort to acquire the US drug services firm Snapdragon Chemistry was rejected by the Treasury Department’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the US.

It is deeply weird to me that Pfizer decided to close the Sandwich site, but if I knew why Pfizer picked its sites for closure, I guess I would be in a different business. But I guess that Asymchem is finding value where Pfizer did not.  

Will the BIOSECURE Act sink WuXi AppTec?

Derek has a longer and pretty thorough post about the Congressional goings on with the BIOSECURE ACT that is being pushed through Congress in both the House and the Senate. I feel this summary from Bloomberg from a week or so ago is good: 

The Biosecure Act states that any pharmaceutical company that works with a “biotechnology company of concern” would be ineligible for US government contracts with agencies like the Department of Health & Human Services and the Department of Defense, potentially limiting drug sales for veterans, the national stockpile and perhaps even Medicare and Medicaid.

There are a lot of concerns, but I think the basic concerns are that these specific companies are associated with the Chinese military, and second, that the Chinese government itself is attempting to collect genomic data from the US. I'm not really sure I have enough information on either of these points, but I'm rather skeptical.*

The most important company to talk about in all of this is WuXi Apptec. It's hard to explain how central? important? essential? they are to the US and global industrial biopharma industry is. I guess I mentally think of them as like Sysco, the restaurant services company that brings your favorite local restaurant its sour cream, meat and napkins. Your Pfizers and Mercks do the work, but a lot of basic R&D and essential production is done by WuXi, and done well. 

It also depends on the impact of the paragraph above. If the intent is to say that WuXi can't sell to the US government, well, I don't think that's a very big deal. How much work does WuXi do for DOD, for example? Probably not much. If the intent of the law is to bar federal contracts (including Medicare and Medicaid) for anyone who does business with WuXi (i.e. you have 10 mgs of peptide made by WuXi in Shanghai, and so we're gonna ban you from the Medicare formulary?) that's a very very very big deal. 

What is bad is that no one seems to know exactly what Congress is trying to do, and how this might impact the US. In this case, I think this guidance post from the DC law firm Arnold and Porter from late January is instructive: 

There are two paths for a version of the BIOSECURE Act to progress through Congress: (1) as part of the FY25 NDAA or (2) attached to a larger legislative package this year. Notably, this legislative effort follows the same model that was used to target Chinese telecommunications companies in the late 2010s. Given the pace of movement, for stakeholders wishing to influence or amend the legislation, we recommend initiating outreach as soon as possible.

H.R. 7085 has been referred to the House Oversight and Accountability Committee and further action has not yet been announced. Although the China Select Committee does not have the ability to advance legislation, the Select Committee can build momentum for the bill. In addition, Rep. Gallagher also serves on the House Armed Services Committee, which allows him to include provisions in defense-related bills. We expect Rep. Gallagher to push for the inclusion of a potentially expanded version of the BIOSECURE Act in the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act as early as mid-April. Congressman Gallagher is not seeking reelection and may view this legislative effort as a legacy item.

In the Senate, Sens. Peters, the Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC), and Hagerty introduced (S.3558), which is substantially similar to the BIOSECURE Act, on December 20, 2023. Sen. Peters listed the bill to be considered during a January 31 HSGAC business meeting, but the bill was held over to the next business meeting. We expect the bill to be considered by the committee in the coming months.

From the Senate perspective, HSGAC has advanced a version of the bill. From the House perspective, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) accused BIO of acting as a foreign agent, and so BIO then removed WuXi as a member and is supporting a version of the bill. I'm kind of shocked by this level of hardball being played by Gallagher, and further shocked at the quick capitulation by BIO. That is a pretty solid sign on which direction the wind is blowing in DC. 

I am a very boring predictor of events. I tend to say "the trend that is happening will continue" and therefore, I expect Congressional gridlock to slow the passage of any version of the BIOSECURE Act. I guess I will also say that I will be watching the FY25 NDAA very carefully to understand if Rep. Gallagher is successful in appending a version of the act to it. Finally, it will be important to understand what the Biden Administration's position on this bill is. As Derek says, if the result is to sever all ties to WuXi, that will make things very expensive for pharma in the short run. 

*This is the point where I strongly associate myself with Derek's position: against the Chinese government, and in favor of all the Chinese scientists I've worked with over the years. I think I've been fairly transparent that I view the Chinese government with suspicion and as a national security threat to the United States. At the same time, I think the United States is often (including this instance) extraordinarily ham-handed when attempting to address potential and actual threats from China. 

C&EN: "House bill targets some Chinese outsourcing firms"

This news (that I somehow missed) from friend of the blog Michael McCoy: 

The stock prices of the pharmaceutical outsourcing providers WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics were pummeled after a US House of Representatives committee introduced a bill that would restrict federally funded medical providers from using several Chinese outsourcing firms.

Based in Shanghai, WuXi AppTec is a top drug service provider and one of the world’s largest employers of chemists. WuXi Biologics is a separate company that WuXi AppTec spun off in 2017. The bill also mentions the private genomics firm BGI Group.

The draft bill, from the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, cites US national security concerns. It says WuXi AppTec has sponsored “military-civil fusion” events in China and received investments from a military-civil integration investment fund.

The bill also says WuXi Biologics CEO Chris Chen was previously an adjunct professor at the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Medical Sciences. Similar legislation has been introduced in the Senate.

WuXi AppTec says in a stock market announcement the findings stated in the draft bill are not accurate. “We are confident that the business development of WuXi AppTec will not pose a security risk to any country,” it says. In its own announcement, WuXi Biologics says the bill references a courtesy designation that Chen received after a guest lecture in 2013.

The language of the draft bill states the following (I think I got the key section): 

The head of an executive agency may not procure or obtain any biotechnology equipment or service produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern; or enter into a contract or extend or renew a contract with any entity that uses biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern and acquired after the applicable effective date in subsection (c) in performance of the contract; or enters into any contract the perform-19 ance of which will require the direct use of biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern and acquired after the applicable effective date in subsection (c). 

I have to say, I am pretty unimpressed with this. First, it will never make it out of Congress. Second, what federal organizations contract with WuXi for drug development services? None of them, I bet. Finally, Congress isn't dumb enough (I think) to say "welp, Merck (or whoever), you're just going to have to stop doing business with WuXi." This is a bluff, and a stupid one. 

NYT: Chinese scientists are retracting their articles in response to PRC government pressure

Via the New York Times: 

Early in 2020, on the same day that a frightening new illness officially got the name Covid-19, a team of scientists from the United States and China released critical data showing how quickly the virus was spreading, and who was dying.

The study was cited in health warnings around the world and appeared to be a model of international collaboration in a moment of crisis.

Within days, though, the researchers quietly withdrew the paper, which was replaced online by a message telling scientists not to cite it. A few observers took note of the peculiar move, but the whole episode quickly faded amid the frenzy of the coronavirus pandemic.

What is now clear is that the study was not removed because of faulty research. Instead, it was withdrawn at the direction of Chinese health officials amid a crackdown on science. That effort kicked up a cloud of dust around the dates of early Covid cases, like those reported in the study.

...Soon, Chinese researchers were asking journals to retract their work. Journals can withdraw papers for a number of legitimate reasons, like flawed data. But a review of more than a dozen retracted papers from China shows a pattern of revising or suppressing research on early cases, conditions for medical workers and how widely the virus had spread — topics that could make the government look bad. The retracted papers reviewed by The Times had been flagged by Retraction Watch, a group that tracks withdrawn research...

....Journals are typically slow to retract papers, even when they are shown to be fraudulent or unethical. But in China, the calculus is different, said Ivan Oransky, a founder of Retraction Watch. Journals that want to sell subscriptions in China or publish Chinese research often bend to the government’s demands. “Scientific publishers have really gone out of their way to placate the censorship requests,” he said...

To get the full context, it's probably best to read the whole article. Sure sounds complicated to be a Chinese viral geneticist. 

Having read it all, and seeing the evidence of political pressure from the Chinese government on journals, it makes me wonder about ACS journals. I can't imagine what kinds of political pressures they might place on ACS (i.e. it's not like ACS is going to be publishing on COVID genetic sequences), but I'm sure something will eventually happen. 

Chinese Community Party official assesses, critiques Chinese science

Via Twitter, an interesting comment about Chinese science from a Chinese Communist Party official (full transcription here): 

Zhang doesn't only blame the US. He outlines how Chinese S&T is falling short:

• Few original breakthroughs;
• Lack of corporate leadership in innovation;
• Disconnect between industry and academia;
• Persistent credentialism and exclusivity culture;
• Overburdened workers.

It would be really interesting to understand exactly what Zhang meant, but I suspect this is buried in about seven layers of nuance that you need a lifetime in Chinese academia to understand who he was Really Criticizing. 

I wish I knew more about the various histories of scientific innovation within nation-states, and how they grow and thrive. There must be some kind of curve/growth (one wonders what a similar critique of US chemistry academia would sound like in 1925) and what limitations the communist system places on Chinese academia (and also what baseline innovation would look like without Communist intervention in 1948?)*

*I mean, you almost have a perfect natural experiment between the People's Republic and Taiwan in terms of academic productivity....

Professor Franklin Tao convicted by Kansas federal jury

Via Chemical and Engineering News (update by Ari Remmel): 

On Thursday, a jury found University of Kansas chemist Feng “Franklin” Tao guilty of 3 counts of wire fraud and 1 count of making false statements. He had been charged with 8 total counts: 6 of wire fraud and two of making false statements. Deliberations began the morning of April 6 at the Robert J Dole United States Courthouse in Kansas City, Kansas.

As the verdict was read Tao was already slumped in his seat, and as he heard the guilty finding he was visibly disappointed. His wife, Hong Peng, appeared anxious before the verdict. She came over and patted Tao on the shoulder after the jury left. Tao’s lawyers quickly led him away.

The verdict was read to a relatively empty courtroom, compared to the crowd that had been there for closing arguments. —Ariana Remmel

I have a sense this will be the last China Initiative prosecution of professors for a while, but we shall see... 

C&EN: Department of Justice to end China Initiative

In this week's Chemical and Engineering News, coverage of the ending of the Department of Justice's China Initiative (article by Andrea Widener): 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will drop its controversial China Initiative and adopt a broader strategy to address economic espionage. Many in the Asian American community met the move with cautious optimism.

The DOJ has been criticized for using the initiative to charge many academic researchers not for stealing secrets but for failing to report connections to China.Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen said in a speech Feb. 23 that after reviewing the program, he had “concluded that this initiative is not the right approach.” Instead, he said, the department will examine the espionage efforts of a number of nations, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Asian American advocacy groups were happy about the shift but worry that Chinese scientists could still be targeted. “Having thousands of professors and scientists sign on to a petition asking to end the China Initiative made a difference,” John C. Yang, executive director of Advancing Justice–AAJC, said in a webinar on the change. “We’re going to ask for all of your help, again, in making sure that DOJ lives up to its promises.”

In his speech, Olsen recognized that the initiative “fueled a narrative of intolerance and bias” that had a chilling effect on researchers, especially those of Chinese descent, and damaged the scientific community. He also vowed that the DOJ would take a more active role in reviewing cases against academics to ensure that people are not improperly charged. 

I'm not surprised by this development - pretty clear that the the Justice Department has been telegraphing this move for a while. I still think what I think at the beginning of this: the People's Republic of China will take what American IP they can get that isn't nailed down, and that the FBI and/or the Department of Justice is poorly positioned to understand what is "worth stealing" and what isn't. Here's hoping this retooling will be both good for Chinese scientists working in the United States and for American national security interests.... 

US government charges MIT engineering professor

Via WBUR, this news about an MIT professor:

An MIT professor was arrested Thursday morning on federal charges that he failed to disclose ties to the Chinese government as he sought — and was awarded — research grants from the U.S. government.

U.S. Attorney Andrew Lelling said its charges against Gang Chen — paired with similar charges filed last summer against Harvard chemistry professor Charles Lieber — represent his office's attempt to counter the Chinese government's effort to "siphon off U.S. technology instead of doing the work themselves."

The charges focus on Chen's behavior since 2012, while he was running a laboratory focused on nanotechnology and energy transfer.

Chen served as chair of M.I.T.'s department of mechanical engineering from 2013 to 2018. Meanwhile, his laboratory attracted over $19 million in grants from federal agencies like the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, according to the complaint.

Here's the full charging document; here's the press release. 

Pretty clear that the United States government is looking very carefully at business and financial ties of STEM professionals who work in both the US and China. It will be interesting to see if this continues to be a major thrust in the Biden Administration.* 

*A brief bit of political punditry: it's hard for me to imagine that the policy of a Clinton Justice Department would have been any different than that of the Trump Administration when it comes to this case, or that of Professor Lieber. 

Congress giving (more) money to US manufacturing?

Via The New York Times, moves afoot to bolster the US semiconductor manufacturing industry in Congress: 

China’s technological ambitions are eliciting rare bipartisan agreement in Washington, with lawmakers considering investing tens of billions of dollars in America’s semiconductor industry over the next five to 10 years to help the United States retain an edge over Beijing. 

A bipartisan measure introduced this week is one of several proposals that would provide substantial funding for the semiconductor industry, which manufactures chips that serve as the tiny brains or memory of electronic devices from smartphones to fitness trackers. 

The efforts reflect a shifting consensus in Washington, as lawmakers look to more expansive government intervention in private markets to help American firms compete. That includes Republicans, who have long criticized government-led industrial plans as inefficient and redolent of communism but have watched with dismay as such efforts in China have allowed it to dominate industries from steel and solar panels to shipbuilding...

It's pretty amazing to watch the moves towards the direct subsidization of American manufacturing. One imagines that this may begin to happen with the pharmaceutical industry as well, especially on the manufacturing side.* Overall, I suspect it will produce more boondoggles than be actually successful, but we shall see. I'm skeptical. 

*If the COVID-19 recession continues, maybe this will change, but I still don't see Americans volunteering to put a chemical manufacturing facility in their town, I just don't. 

A useful paragraph from this week's C&EN

I have long desired a complete profile of the structure of academic and governmental chemical R&D in China. We have a general sense of the Harvard of China (Peking University) and some prominent institutions (Hangzhou University and the Shanghai Institute of Organic Chemistry, say.) Outside of that, I confess my near-complete ignorance of the structure of the Chinese academic R&D apparatus.

So I welcome Mitch Jacoby's profile about the Beijing-based Institute of Chemistry of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (ICCAS), and I thought this was an especially helpful comment:

As might be expected from a large bureaucratic country, much of China’s scientific research is organized according to a hierarchical laboratory system. For example, the academy supports many so-called CAS Key Laboratories. CAS awards that prestigious designation—and the ample level of funding that goes with it—to teams of investigators with an impressive research track record in a select area. 

ICCAS is home to eight such labs including the CAS Key Laboratory of Organic Solids, the CAS Key Laboratory of Green Printing, the CAS Key Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry for Living Biosystems, and the CAS Key Laboratory of Engineering Plastics. 

A step up from those labs—in terms of prestige and financial support—are the so-called State Key Laboratories. ICCAS is home to three such labs, including the State Key Laboratory of Polymer Physics & Chemistry, the State Key Laboratory of Molecular Dynamics, and the State Key Laboratory for Structural Chemistry of Unstable & Stable Species.

Read the whole thing!